

Both ENDS Information Pack Nr.16

The Cotonou Agreement

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The Cotonou Agreement

Introduction

In June 2000, the European Union (EU) signed a co-operation agreement with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries - an arrangement referred to as the Cotonou Agreement. The Agreement follows four successive Lomé Conventions that laid out a framework for cooperation between the EU and ACP for 25 years. As a successor to the Lomé Conventions, the new Cotonou Agreement provides a framework for the EU's cooperation with 79 ACP countries encompassing trade, aid and political dialogue.

The Cotonou Agreement represents a new departure in ACP-EU relation. It aims to operate under World Trade Organization (WTO) compatible trade arrangements, while at the same time, enhancing the ACP region's role in the world economy. Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) are an integral part of the Cotonou approach: new reciprocal trade systems based on regional integration and development.

The following Information Package will provide a historical overview of the Cotonou Agreement, as well as highlight some of the key objectives and principles. It will focus mainly on the issue of Economic Partnership Agreements and related consequences for ACP countries, but will also explore other more specific issues such as EDF budgetisation and civil society participation.

It should be noted that this information package is not comprehensive in its analysis; rather, it acts as a introduction to issues concerning the Cotonou Agreement. For more information, please contact Both ENDS or refer to highlighted discussion papers.

List of abbreviations

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of countries
CSO	Civil society organisation(s)
CSS	Country support strategy
EC	European Commission
EDF	European Development Fund
EIB	European Investment Bank
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement(s)
EU	European Union
LDC(s)	Least Developing Country(s)
MFN	Most-Favoured Nation
NAO	National Authorising Officer ¹
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NIP	National Indicative Plan
NSA	Non-State Actor
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PRSP(s)	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper(s)
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
WTO	World Trade Organization

¹ Government official responsible for co-operation with the EU under the Cotonou Agreement

Chapter 1 The Cotonou Agreement

1.1 The Foundations of the Cotonou Agreement

The Cotonou Agreement is the current and principal framework for co-operation between the European Union and 79 countries in the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group. Unlike its predecessors, the Lomé Conventions and the Yaoundé agreements, the Cotonou Agreement covers a twenty-year period from 1 March 2000.

The Lomé Conventions (1975-1995) have been considered highly innovative models of international cooperation. Prior to Lomé I, Yaoundé I (1963-69) and Yaoundé II (1969-75) Agreements facilitated some economic cooperation and infrastructure development for African countries following decolonisation. Both Yaoundé Agreements, however, provided resources for primarily French-speaking Africa. The Lomé I Convention established a much wider set of signatories leading to creation of the ACP group of (then) 46 nations.

Some of the conventions' noteworthy features included predictable aid flow combined with non-reciprocal trade benefits and the introduction of the STABEX system (see box below). It also introduced separate trading protocols for primary exports such as sugar, beef and bananas and established negotiations on mutual obligations such human rights. Lomé I, signed in 1975, established the ACP group as a result of common interests

The ACP-EU relationship solidified by the Lomé Conventions, however, came under growing pressure for change. Effectiveness and overall export performance of ACP countries deteriorated during the twenty-five years under Lomé. For instance, the ACP region's share of the EU market declined from 6,7% in 1976 to 3% in 1998. Other indicators such as number of Least Developed Countries (LDC) demonstrated the critical state of many ACP countries. At the time of the European Commission's 1996 Green Paper on relations between the European Union and the ACP, 41 of the world's 50 LDCs were ACP countries.² Additionally, the Lomé Convention was increasingly seen as incompatible with rules of the WTO and perceived as an inefficient and overly-bureaucratic cooperation system.

STABEX & SYSMIN Facilities

Lomé incorporated two mechanisms, STABEX and SYSMIN, to provide resources for specific purposes. Along with emergency aid and structural adjustment support, these instruments acted as 'programme aid' – an integral component of ACP support.

STABEX helped to stabilize export earnings of certain raw materials for ACP countries. The SYSMIN facility financed the ACP mining sectors. Both the STABEX and SYSMIN facilities were ended with the commencement of the Cotonou Agreement in favour of 'rolling programming', (a system which will be explained in section 1.3.2). Evaluations carried out by the EC concluded that despite a large budget for the STABEX scheme, it was unable to significantly influence or compensate for the overall worldwide drop in producers' earnings.

Source: European Commission. (1997). *Global Evaluation of STABEX*.
europa.eu.int/comm/europeaid/evaluation/evinfo/acp/951329_ev.html

² According to the definition of Least Developed Countries, the current number of LDCs (with official status) now rests at 49. The official criteria that is used to determine status is: per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of \$100 (in 1968 US\$) or less; share of manufacturing in total GDP of 10 % or less; and adult literacy rate of 20% or less. It is important to note that this figure is continually changing.

From non-reciprocity and non-discrimination to reciprocity and difference

As a result of growing pressures on the Lomé Convention, the European Commission (EC) initiated a consultation process to investigate the future of ACP-EU relations. The Green Paper (1996) laid the foundations for negotiations on a new agreement. A striking shift in EU perspective during the negotiation process elucidated future changes. Aid would become more selective and linked to performance. Furthermore, trade rules would follow WTO norms. Countries would be treated differently and encouraged to foster regional linkages. Finally, civil society and the private sector (referred to as Non-State Actors) would have heightened involvement in the new agreement. One of the most considerable transformations has been the introduction of a set of reciprocal Economic Partnership Agreements that will replace non-reciprocal tariff preferences beginning in 2008.

The Cotonou Agreement will last for twenty years (until 2020), however, there is a clause within the agreement stipulating the possibility to revise the agreement every five years. A financial protocol accompanies the agreement, indicating that resources will be available through the European Development Fund (EDF) for each five year period (see section 1.5).

1.2 Objectives and Principles

The central objectives of ACP-EU cooperation are *reduction and eventual eradication of poverty* as well as *insertion and integration into the world economy*. Cooperation is based on a number of key principles:

- i) *Equality of partners*: In principle, the Agreement recognises the sovereignty of ACP states in decision-making and the necessary ownership of development strategies.
- ii) *Participation*: Partnerships with new actors referred to as Non-State Actors (including civil society, private sector and local governments) have been added in the new agreement.
- iii) *Regional and differentiated strategies*: Cooperation agreements will vary for each country/region's level of development, performance and long-term development strategy. LDCs and other vulnerable countries will be given special treatment.
- iv) *Dialogue and mutual obligations*: The EU and ACP groups must have mutual obligations that are continuously monitored through dialogue.

The Agreement also recognises a number of core 'essential' values including respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law. Violation of essential values may result in suspension of aid.

Good governance: A political conditionality?

Good governance did not play a crucial role in previous Lomé conventions, and thus was introduced in the Cotonou negotiations by the EU. The Agreement defines good governance as 'transparent and accountable management of human, natural, economic and financial resources' along with 'clear-decision making procedures at the level of public authorities, transparent and accountable institutions.'

Although the EU pushed for good governance to be considered an 'essential' element of the agreement, strict ACP opposition left good governance constituting only a 'fundamental' element. The EU was successful, however, at introducing an additional measure of conditionality, Article 97, which acts as a suspension clause. It specifies that in cases where the EU deems good governance to be violated and where the EU is also a significant partner in financial support to economic policies, it may demand a consultation between parties.

Many argue that the term is overly pliable, inherently vague, and acts as yet another political conditionality for ACP states.

1.3 ACP-EU Institutions

Three official bodies guide ACP-EU cooperation:

The ACP-EU Council of Ministers – (comprising of members of the Council of the EU, representatives of the European Commission, and a member of the government of each ACP country). The President of the Council alternates between the European Union and the ACP. The Council meets as a rule once a year to discuss political issues and ensure effective implementation and smooth cooperation.

The ACP-EU Committee of Ambassadors - (comprising of the permanent representative of each Member State to the EU, a representative of the Commission and the head of mission of each ACP state to the EU, with an alternating chairmanship). The Council of Ministers delegates power to and permits the Committee to carry out tasks and monitor the Cotonou Agreement.

The Joint Parliamentary Assembly – (comprising of an equal number of EU and ACP parliamentary representatives). The Assembly meets twice a year in plenary sessions, and may also arrange regional and sub-regional meetings. It is also responsible for ongoing contact with EU-ACP civil society. In general, the Assembly adopts resolutions, makes recommendations to the Council and discusses issues pertinent to the Agreement. Within the Assembly, there are three Standing Committees which draw up substantive proposals to be voted on by the Assembly. The current Standing Committees are: Political Affairs; Economic Development, Finance and Trade; and Social Affairs and the Environment.

For more information, refer to:

1. ECDPM. 2001. *Cotonou Infokit: The Institutions (6)*. Maastricht: ECDPM. www.ecdpm.org

1.4 Pillars of Cooperation

Although the agreement covers many aspects of cooperation, the two main areas of focus are *trade* and *aid*. Both the trade and aid regimes will undergo significant transformation as part of the Cotonou Agreement.

1.4.1 Trade

In comparison to previous Lomé Conventions, economic and trade cooperation will undergo acute transformation. Non-reciprocal tariffs, trade preferences and commodity protocols - all leftover elements of Lomé's preferential trade regime – infringe on the concept of non-discrimination. Non-discrimination is a cornerstone of current international trade policy, a central rule of the WTO, and an element integrated into the Cotonou Agreement. The principle of non-discrimination follows the 'Most-Favoured Nation' treatment: favour one, favour all. In other words, trading partners should be treated equally and if a country, for instance, allows foreign competition in a sector, it must guarantee equal opportunities in that sector for *all* service providers from other WTO-member countries. The question that remains is: *Will ACP producers be in the position to effectively compete with more price competitive exports from the EU with the introduction of reciprocity?*

The 'Most-Favoured Nation' (MFN) principle has made Lomé's trade preferences incompatible with WTO rules. A waiver, which will extend Lomé trade preferences for a 7- year adjustment period, will end on December 31, 2007. This waiver was negotiated under the Doha Development Round within the framework of the WTO. In an effort to make strategic choices concerning trade policies, ACP countries chose to focus on negotiating a trade preference extension. In many ACP countries' opinions, such a waiver would act as an essential element in adjusting to a new trade regime. A significant amount of ACP representatives' energy went into waiver negotiations at Doha; as a result, other ACP interests had to be, by and large, ignored.

In the place of preferential trade instruments, reciprocal Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are being negotiated to function as the primary arrangement within the ACP-EU trade regime. The EPAs, proposed by the European Commission, will be free trade areas (FTAs) between regional ACP groupings and the EU covering trade in goods and agricultural products and services. The EPAs are consistent with the general direction taken by the EU in recent years: basing differentiated strategies by regions and sub-regions. The EU pushed for implementation of EPAs for a variety of reasons. First, the EU would like to promote faster economic growth, increased competitiveness, better export performance and higher levels of private investment in ACP countries. In turn, EPAs will be extremely beneficial for the EU, in that the EU will have stronger reciprocal trade links resulting in an overall reduction in tariffs on exports to ACP countries. Strategically, the EU wishes to reinforce its presence in particular ACP markets. By maintaining good trading conditions with ACP countries, the EU will avoid trade hindrances in the event that other regions seek out privileged relations with economically important ACP countries.

For a more comprehensive analysis of Cotonou trade policy, please refer to Chapter 2.

For more information, refer to:

1. ECDPM. 2001. *Cotonou Infokit: From Lomé to Cotonou (13)*. Maastricht: ECDPM. www.ecdpm.org
2. European Commission. 1996. *Green Paper on relations between the European Union and the ACP countries on the eve of the 21st century*. Brussels: European Commission. europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/publications/l-vert/lv1_en.pdf#zoom=100
3. EU-ACP. 2000. *The Cotonou Agreement*. europa.eu.int/comm/development/cotonou/agreement_en.htm.
4. European Commission. 1995. "Free Trade Areas: An Appraisal" Brussels: European Commission www.euronet.nl/users/burghard.ilge/ec/sec95-322/sec95-322-final.rtf

1.4.2 Aid

Aid, also referred to as financial and technical cooperation, complements trade arrangements as the second pillar of cooperation aiming to eradicate poverty and stimulate sustainable development.

The Cotonou Agreement introduces a new 'programming process' which facilitates dialogue concerning strategies and priorities for aid. National (or regional) consultations between the EU and ACP governments provide the planning foundation for allocation of resources to a country (or region). This exercise determines sectors with priority, the type of assistance to be provided and the most appropriate agencies for implementation. The programming process is the responsibility of delegations and partner governments, in consultation with non-state actors (see section 1.5).

First, national programming must generate a *Country Support Strategy (CSS)*³ outlining the country's own development strategies; an analysis of the country situation; and the EU response. It is concentrated on a limited number of sectors and

³ Country Support Strategies are also referred to by some, as Country Strategy Plans (CSP).

takes into account the role and activities of other donors. Second, programming must produce a *National Indicative Programme* (NIP) drawn up on the basis of the CSS. The NIP, a five-year plan, identifies core areas funds will be allocated to and more concrete proposals for funding for the first two years of the period. Mid-term and end-term reviews take place to take into account performance. In cases of poor performance, programmes can be changed or dropped.

In countries that have already incorporated Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) – a World Bank / IMF effort to prioritise countries' macroeconomic, structural and social policies – NIPs will draw heavily on PRSPs.

The Cotonou Agreement's programming system divides financing into two categories – the Grant Facility and the Investment Facility. Concentration of programming operations aims to promote greater efficiency and impact.

Grant Facility

The Grant Facility was designed to simplify and improve coherence in the management of resources. The facility is divided into a 'long-term' envelope supporting ACP countries' development strategies and a 'regional' envelope aiming to provide resources for regional integration efforts. The resources allocated through the Grant Facility are determined on the basis of needs and performance. Resources may finance activities such macro-economic support, decentralised cooperation, debt relief and sector policies. Each ACP country will maintain a CSS and a NIP for implementation of finances from the grant envelope. A regular review mechanism will ensure necessary up-dating to respond to changing needs and performances. This system is known as 'rolling programming'.

The Cotonou Agreement terminates both the STABEX and SYSMIN facilities and merges the two mechanisms into the EDF.

Investment Facility

The Investment Facility replaces the Lomé Conventions' risk capital and interest-rate subsidy. A key change is the size of security funds available for short, medium and long-term investment. In this way, the facility intends to stimulate regional and international investment and develop a more viable private sector.

The resources for the Agreement's current five year period (2002-2007) are broken down in the following categories (in billion Euro):

Source	Amount (billion Euro)
EDF:	13.5
Long-term envelope	10
Regional envelope	1.3
Investment envelope	2.2
Remaining resources from previous EDF	9.9
European Investment Bank (EIB)	1.7
Total	25.1

Poor Quality of EU Aid

As the chart illustrates, the EU has a large budget set aside for aid to ACP countries. However, the chart also shows that the remaining resources from previous budgets is quite large. With continually growing unspent funds, it has become more and more difficult to see what happens with allocated funds.

Some argue that the structure of the EU aid regime tends to be fragmented and incoherent. Additionally, many believe too much attention is given to implementation and results. It should be noted, however, that such weaknesses are the result of constraints imposed by Member States themselves. For instance, Member States refuse to allocate additional funds to increase staff capacity and improve aid expenditure in ACP countries, while at the same time criticize the minimal impact of aid on poverty eradication.

For more information, refer to:

1. ECDPM. 2001. *Cotonou Infokit: The Instruments (7)*. Maastricht: ECDPM. www.ecdpm.org

1.5 EDF Budgetisation

The European Development Fund is funded from the direct contributions for Member States based on their GNP as well as historical links with ACP states involved. The EDF is currently undergoing budgetisation; a process which will enable the Fund to be subject to the principle of annuality. For this reason, on-going projects dating back to the 6th, 7th and 8th EDFs have created a backlog which will be dealt with by bringing all outstanding projects together into the current 9th EDF.

Budgetisation of the European Development Fund (EDF) implies the incorporation of the EDF budget into the normal EU budget. Since the EDF governs cooperation with ACP countries under the Cotonou agreement, EDF procedures will undergo application of EU budgetary procedures. Many feel that EDF budgetisation is a positive step for Cotonou proceedings because it brings ACP-EU funding under democratic control of the European Parliament.

However, EDF budgetisation raises a number of concerns regarding current and future EU-ACP arrangements, as well as external relationships. First, EDF budgetisation may disrupt the quantity and quality of aid to ACP countries. Incorporation into the greater EU budget may make it difficult to ensure that the EDF's attention towards low-income countries will be protected within the EU budget, which demonstrates a much greater focus on middle-income countries. Furthermore, funds that have been earmarked for ACP countries within the EDF may become vulnerable to other foreign policy objectives. The European Commission argues that EDF budgetisation will not marginalize EU-ACP cooperation; rather the EU budget will be a more flexible structure for a variety of commitments. However, the comparatively safe and viable nature of EDF funding will be replaced by various EU interests which may marginalize ACP development cooperation and facilitate shifting commitments to other regions. The European Commission also argues that EDF budgetisation will speed up the dispersal of allocations and thus, free up lengthy delays in EDF procedure. However, the principle of annual allocation of funds in the EU budget may affect the *quality* of fund dispersal and generate greater emphasis on the *rate* of allocation.

Changes to the quantity and quality of development aid allocation may further be exacerbated by the enlargement of the EU and the varying commitments of the 10 new Member States regarding development cooperation with Africa. In the period 1999-2001, only 5% of Czech Official Development Assistance (ODA) and 0.5% of Slovak ODA was directed to Africa. Although new Member States have accepted the need to contribute to the EDF, these two examples demonstrate historical commitments.

A second issue concerning EDF budgetisation centers on ownership and participation. By incorporating the EDF into the EU budget, the Council and the European Parliament will have a much greater role and will limit the possibilities of partnership and ownership which have been defined as central elements of the Cotonou Agreement. Emphasis on EU Member States positions has created a biased sentiment which negates partnership and ownership; rather it encourages the continuation of unequal power dynamics.

Doubts of partnership and ownership may also be raised in other aspects of ACP-EU cooperation. In recent ACP-EU Joint Ministerial Council meetings, the EU has tabled successive controversial issues which put into question the true level of ACP partnership. For instance, at a Joint Ministerial Council meeting in Botswana in May 2004, the EU suggested an additional clause to the Cotonou Agreement on the fight against terrorism and on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The EU also proposed a 'non-execution of EPA' clause which would apply to *all* countries of a region if *one* of them violates the provisions of the EPA in force. Critics argue this clause would act as an unacceptable collective punishment. Clearly, bias towards the more influential EU continues to impact cooperation considerably.

For more information, refer to:

1. Eurostep. *Integration of co-operation with ACP countries in the EU Budget: The Budgetisation of the EDF*. www.eurostep.org/pubs/position/acp-eu-cotonou/con3052_edf_rev1.pdf
2. CONCORD Cotonou Working Group. (2004). *Budgetising the European Development Fund*. www.concordeurope.org/download.cfm?media=pdfUK&id=477
3. Europa. *European Development Fund*. europa.eu.int/comm/budget/fed/index_en.htm

1.6 Role of Non-State Actors

The Cotonou Agreement incorporates an innovative commitment to recognise non-state actors (NSA) as legitimate partners in the EU's cooperation with ACP countries. This commitment will play a vital role for accountability of state actors, strengthening the position of ACP countries, representation of specific concerns and will allow civil society the opportunity to monitor Cotonou funds. Currently, there are basic guidelines which set out five areas for NSA involvement in the programming process: (i) consultation on cooperation policies, political dialogue and national development strategies; (ii) participation in the implementation of projects and programmes; (iii) participation in performance review; (iv) access to financial resources; and finally, (iv) access to capacity-building support to promote effective consultation and implementation of programmes.

ACP Civil Society Case Studies

Eurostep coordinated a thorough report of seven country studies produced by civil society actors discussing levels of participation during the process of defining the CSS and NIPs. The following provides two brief case studies from the report; however, for more information please refer to Country Studies at: eurostep.antenna.nl/detail_page.phtml?page=pubs_position_acp-eu-cotonou_index

Dominican Republic: Non-State actors in the Dominican Republic completed a questionnaire regarding information, consultation, and dialogue. The two most glaring issues brought up by the questionnaire were: i) that NSA still need to be more informed about the process, and the level of information provided to NSA is still too low; ii) that NSA need more knowledge and understanding of their own role in the cooperation process to be able to carry out their assigned functions.

Tanzania: Various surveys targeting civil society organizations, the Tanzanian Ministry of Finance as the principal Government department handling EU-Tanzania co-operation and the EU delegate were used for this study. Similar themes and problem areas emerge in the Tanzanian case: i) language used in documents is very difficult to understand and overly technical; ii) less effort was made to create awareness and understanding of Cotonou Agreement issues, compared with the PRSP process; iii) the government seemed to consider there was little need for involving NSA in finalizing the NIP because NSA were drawn on for the more participatory PRSP; iv) and finally, NSA felt there was little time for dialogue.

While the implementation of the Agreement is still at an early stage, some preliminary conclusions can be made regarding challenges to extending participation to NSA:

- *Widely dispersing information* – NSA must be properly informed, but it is unclear at this time how this process will be coordinated. Many argue that the timing of programming exercises is too tight to allow for sufficient opportunity for NSA to join. In other words, NSA have had little time thus far, to carry out dialogue among themselves and to prepare policies and proposals *prior* to programming exercises.
- *Selecting actors* - Guidelines for deciding who will be invited to participate within ACP-EU cooperation are still vague within the Agreement. Non-state actors must

meet the following criterion: i) demonstrable competency; ii) extent to which they address needs of the population; and iii) demonstration of democratic and transparent organization. To date, a limited range of civil society actors have been recognised and involved in the process. Furthermore, critics argue that responsibilities and roles of various actors must still be clarified to ensure effective participation of NSA.

- *Confronting political resistance* – Some NSA may face opposition from other politically-powerful groups. As a result, the scope of participation by NSA may be jeopardised.
- *Providing capacity-building* – Involving NSA in decision-making processes is a new practice. NSA may not be familiar with participation; likewise central governments may not be used to ensuring involvement of NSA. On both sides, it will be essential to work on capacity-building issues.
- *Obtaining funds* – The Agreement has established new opportunities for NSA to access funds for National or Regional Indicative Programmes, allocated to each ACP country for a five-year period. At this time however, NSA have been presented with little clear information regarding *how* to obtain funds.
- *Misguided understandings of 'participation'* – All too often participation is equated with consultation, rather than a consistent process of dialogue and planning.

In 2003 the European Commission proposed to draw 1 billion euro from the EDF to be spend on water and sanitation in ACP countries. The process of consultation around the establishment of this fund do not comply with the principles of Cotonou, as ACP civil society is not included in the process at all. Instead a selection of European civil society organisations is consulted informally. Apart from concerns regarding the scope of the consultation process (the timing of the meeting (i.e. in the middle of the summer holidays) and the relatively short notice for receiving the invitation, are causing problems in preparation and coordination, whilst the announced discussion document had not been distributed before the actual consultation meeting), critical remarks can also be placed towards the inclusiveness of the consultation process. The process does not include a representative amount of ACP civil society organisations, but only involves a selected number of EU civil society organisations. Although these organisations aim to represent civil society in the South to a certain extend, the fact that most of these organisations hold a financial interest in the Facility does not take away the serious question marks that can be placed towards the degree of representation and inclusiveness of those involved in the consultation process, let alone that these organisations represent the pallet of interest involved in water and sanitation.

On the basis of these challenges, it is unclear how the Agreement will ensure effective participation of civil society in the future. Efforts to integrate NSA have been well-intended thus far, yet lack consistency, quality and scope. Areas for direct improvement include: benchmarking to measure the quality and level of civil society participation; enhanced and continuous information dispersal; consultation report-backs to NSA, and investment in capacity building.

For more information, refer to:

1. ECDPM. 2001. *Cotonou Infokit: Participating in Programming (9)*. Maastricht: ECDPM. www.ecdpm.org
2. Eurostep. 2003. *ACP-EU Joint Council of Ministers: Dialogue with civil society* (Presentation by Eurostep Director, Simon Stocker) www.eurostep.org/detail_pub.phtml?&username=guest@eurostep.org&password=9999&groups=EUROSTEP&page=pubs_position_acp-eu-cotonou_pres_030516
3. Eurostep, Weed, terre des hommes & Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. 2002. *The Cotonou Agreement New Perspective for European Trade Policy?*

Chapter 2 Economic Partnership Agreements

2.1 Introduction

The EU has been negotiating 'Economic Partnership Agreements' (EPAs) since September 2002 with 77 developing countries from the ACP (minus South Africa which signed a regional trade agreement with the EU in 1999 and Cuba which did not sign the Cotonou Agreement) and is set to complete negotiations by 31 December, 2007. These negotiations form part of the broader European trade liberalization agenda.

The Cotonou Agreement acts as the basis for a new trade regime governed by multiple EPAs between the EU and several regional groupings of ACP states. Argued by the EU as a tool for development and ACP integration into the world economy, EPAs represent a controversial new form of cooperation and threaten to jeopardise many fragile ACP countries' development strategies.

The EPAs will replace trade preferences beginning in January 2008, progressively removing barriers to trade between the EU and ACP countries and introducing a new set of WTO-compatible free trade arrangements. Some refer to EPAs as a new trade regime that will be 'WTO-plus' due to a narrow interpretation of the WTO's rule that requires "essentially all" trade barriers removed (EU interpretation – more than 90% of all currently traded goods over a 12-year transition period) and the inclusion of investment, competition, government procurement, trade facilitation and data protection in negotiations. Many argue that the transition period ending in 2020 is much too short and does not allow for sufficient time for ACP countries to adjust. Numerous ACP countries currently face serious capacity constraints which may curtail their ability to manage changes associated with EPAs. Constraints include poor infrastructure, weak institutional and policy frameworks, lower levels of labour productivity and high HIV/AIDS rates. Furthermore, the fact that 'WTO-compatible' is interpreted by the EU as compatible to the EU's desirable outcome, whilst given the changing nature of WTO rules (negotiations are still going on). On the other hand the ACP has made it clear that they have only signed up to the Cotonou Agreement on the basis of WTO rules 'then prevailing'.

These kinds of restraints are only the beginning though. The following section highlights key issues concerning the introduction of EPAs that will have profound implications for ACP economies.

In the run-up to the signing of the Cotonou Agreement in 2000, many questioned the EU's intention to push the agreement in its current form. Especially the negotiations of Economic Partnership Agreements were controversial and still are, as the EU has not been able to convince its critics of its good intentions. In their analysis different civil society experts challenge the notion that the EU aims to make EPAs benefit the development of ACP countries. They distinguish three different 'interests for the EU to negotiate these trade agreements. Through negotiating EPAs, the EU can gain market access for its agricultural products to the ACP markets. Secondly, by going into regional trade agreements, the EU is able to secure the important import of raw materials from the ACP countries. Finally, the EU has a clear interest to hold on to a strong relationship with the ACP. The EU is the ACPs most important trading partner, which it can capitalise when ACP economies would prosper. ACP companies would turn to their EU trading partners first and EU companies would have access to benefit from possible economic prosperity in the ACP through their investments.

In the framework of the WTO EPAs could be beneficial as well. By negotiation EPAs with more than half of the WTO's membership could strengthen the EU's agenda in the WTO. The EU can certainly use some support in the WTO, as their agricultural subsidies, as well as their push to negotiate the so-called Singapore issues have not increased the EU's popularity in the world.

2.2 Implications of Economic Partnership Agreements

Although at this point it is difficult to assess the actual costs or to know exact implications of EPAs, it is clear that EPAs have the potential to lead to a series of negative impacts for ACP countries. Whilst the Cotonou Agreement leaves the possibility open for alternative trade agreements to be discussed, the EU refuses to consider to research possible alternative options, despite the major concerns that many have raised with EPAs.

A. Exposing ACP economies to EU competition

The first stumbling block - exposing vulnerable ACP countries to EU competition – encompasses the entire trade liberalisation process. It is feared that producers in LDCs, land-locked countries and island economies will not be able to compete with import surges of duty-free (and often highly subsidised) European goods. Increased EU competition may accelerate the deterioration of manufacturing sectors in many countries. This may in fact deny many countries the opportunity to expand their value-added sectors as well as influence the continuation of primarily raw material export from ACP countries.

ACP agriculture is a key sector that will experience difficulty. Agriculture and agro-processing industries in ACP countries accounts for approximately 36% of all ACP exports to the EU. However, the EU fuels its agricultural production by highly subsidising the sector by way of its Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). Liberalising trade in the agriculture sector will result in cheaper EU products on ACP markets and distorting effects such as increased EU product dumping. Many believe that the introduction of ACP-EU free trade in the agricultural sector may undermine the scope of agricultural development in ACP countries and lead to higher rates in unemployment in rural areas.

Key sectors in many ACP countries are anticipated to be influenced by new ACP-EU trade arrangements. In Jamaica, for instance, the dairy industry will be marginalised as a result of liberalised trade. The influx of imported dairy products into Jamaica began in the early 1990s when the country reduced import tariffs on these products (the country was uncomfortable imposing taxes on imports from the EU as it depends on the EU for its preferential sugar and banana access). Since the early 1990s, the EU has more than tripled its exports to Jamaica, and now accounts for the source of 67% of the total volume of imported milk powder in the country. This influx has been critically damaging on Jamaica's dairy sector. Nestle, one of the two dairy processors, cut milk purchases from local farmers from 15 million litres per year to 6 million litres in 2001. As a result, the number of small-scale farmers has been reduced to less than one hundred farmers (down from the thousands operating dairy farms in the 1960s). Jamaican milk producers now account for a mere 12% of the total domestic milk market. Many argue that by opening up the market further to the EU by negotiating an EPA could have disastrous effects on the dairy sector.

In Benin, cotton growers will experience similar difficulties. Cotton and its by-products make up approximately 60-70% of the country's total exports. Since 1998, the cotton sector in Benin has experience falling world prices and mismanagement. Thus, revenues from cotton exports have fallen dramatically. The regional cotton industry fills just 20% of regional demand signalling large market opportunities. However, due to strict country-of-origin rules for production, textile manufacturing in Benin and other West African countries has not been viable. Most textile manufacturing requires the use of other materials from third countries that go beyond the rule of origin limits. As cotton prices continue to fall, textile manufacturing presents a viable alternative for poverty reduction in Benin. However, this will not be possible unless the EU adopts more suitable rules such as cumulation of origin. In this framework it is noteworthy that the Commission's own impact assessment warns that EPAs could lead to the collapse of the modern manufacturing sector in West-Africa.

For more information, refer to:

1. CONCORD Cotonou Working Group. 2004. *Why the EU Approach to Regional Trade Negotiations With Developing Countries is Bad for Development*.
www.concordeurope.org/download.cfm?media=pdfUK&id=597
2. Eurostep, GAWU, DHS, CIECA, GRAPAD. 2004. *New ACP-EU Trade Arrangements: New Barriers to Poverty Eradication?*. Brussels: Eurostep. eurostep.antenna.nl/docs/200405111106292970.pdf

B. Substantial adjustment associated with EPAs

The adjustment challenge associated with the introduction of EPAs represents yet another stumbling block with great consequences for ACP countries. The exposure to increased EU trade competition will require significant funds for ACP governments to invest in production and supply capacities as well as compensatory measures in the social sector. Additionally, funds to cover the costs associated with the preparation, establishment and operation of the EPAs will be required. However, at this time the EU refuses to commit adequately to providing necessary funds for the adjustment costs associated with EPAs. As a result, many ACP countries are expected to make immense commitments without the sufficient assurance of having the financial resources to do so. Where the EU often refers to funding that will have to be made available to cover substantial adjustment associated with EPA's, in practice no money seem to be available. ACP countries are asking for additional funds, whereas according to the Commission these funds need to be made available from the EDF. The problem is that EDF money is already been committed according to the needs of ACP countries laid down in CSSs and NIPs. In the current situation, no funds are available until the establishment of a new EDF (the 10TH) in 2008. EPAs are foreseen to be implemented from the same year onwards.

Potential use of aid leverage to impose undesirable trade policies

The Cotonou Agreement generally, and EPAs specifically have created a strong link between trade and aid; a link that was considerably weaker in previous Lomé conventions. Such newly embedded linkages have the potential to be used as leverages to force undesirable (or, at least, politically unsustainable) trade policy changes on ACP governments in the future. Aid conditionality presented by donors is a growing trend in development policy. Many fear aid will be used as leverage to encourage further liberalisation of trade policies and EPAs.

C. Significant fiscal costs for ACP countries

Eliminating tariffs and introducing free trade will have significant implications for future ACP government revenue. In many ACP countries, customs duties constitute a major source of government revenue, of which EU imports are a major part. National fiscal incomes, already facing substantial adjustment costs related to EPAs, will be *further* reduced by removing tariffs. A reduction of fiscal income will compromise many governments' abilities and capacities for providing social services. Losses in revenues from import duties may also lead to severe economic distortions. What is clear is that additional financial resources will be necessary for sustaining ACP governments' abilities.

For more information, refer to:

1. EPAWatch. 2002. *Fiscal Implications*. www.epawatch.net/general/text.php?itemID=11&menuID=33
2. European Research Office. 2003. *Namibian-EU Trade: A Summary*.
3. CONCORD Cotonou Working Group. 2004. *Why the EU Approach to Regional Trade Negotiations With Developing Countries is Bad for Development*.
www.concordeurope.org/download.cfm?media=pdfUK&id=597
4. EPAWatch. 2002. *Market Access and Making Use of Trade Preferences*.
www.epawatch.net/documents/doc10_1.doc

Fiscal Challenges and Market Access: The Case of Namibia

Namibia faces a number of fiscal and market related challenges as a result of negotiations for a Southern Africa EPA. Market access will most dramatically affect earnings from beef exports to the EU market, which have declined between 28 and 30% since 1999. It is thought that other sectors such as dairy, flour and meat product sectors will also be affected. Approximately 83% of the EU's current agricultural exports to the South African Customs Union (SACU) will be introduced as duty free trade.

Namibia has a relatively high dependence on customs duties collected on imports to the SACU. Thus, the elimination of import duties will reduce the overall regional revenue generation and reduce payment to individual countries like Namibia. There are estimates that between 25 and 30% of all Namibian government revenue is derived from SACU revenue between 1990-1996. A regional EPA, without import duties for EU products, will limit the abilities of the Namibian government and may have severe effects for the budget deficit. Furthermore, many believe there is limited scope for increasing personal and corporate taxation due to the mobility of investment and people within the SACU.

D. Differing economic positions between the LDCs and non-LDCs

Both the EU and the ACP recognize the varying levels of economic and social well-being of ACP countries. In the EU's widely promoted initiative, the so-called "Everything But Arms" (2001) initiative, LDCs receive duty and quota free access to the European market. While there has been some consideration for the diversity of ACP countries' positions, if an LDC commits to joining an EPA it must also commit to maximizing the elimination of its trade barriers and open their markets. Under EPAs, LDCs lose the market access they already possessed, and thus, many argue that LDCs are in fact receiving *no special treatment at all*. Furthermore, EPAs composed of ACP countries with varying economic positions will make it difficult for the poorest LDCs to compete regionally and internationally.

For more information, refer to:

1. EPAWatch. 2002. *Least Development Countries and Economic Partnership Agreements*. www.epawatch.net/general/text.php?itemID=14&menuID=33
2. CONCORD Cotonou Working Group. 2004. *Why the EU Approach to Regional Trade Negotiations With Developing Countries is Bad for Development*. www.concordeurope.org/download.cfm?media=pdfUK&id=597

E. External implications of EU policies

Reforms to EU policies have immense consequences for ACP countries. The value of the existing ACP preferences (market access) has diminished as a result of the reform to the European Common Agriculture Policy (CAP). CAP reform has resulted in gradually lower EU agricultural prices which clearly affects the returns of ACP agricultural product exports to the EU market. Reforms to the beef sector, for example, have resulted in a 13% decline in average EU beef prices. CAP reform has led to a 50% fall in prices in the cereal sector since 1992. The European Commission has estimated that if reform to the sugar sector were to be pursued, the price of sugar could drop by 25% resulting in an annual income loss to ACP sugar exporters of approximately US\$ 250 million. Clearly, CAP reform – a notable EU policy - has had palpable implications for the relative competitiveness of EU and ACP agricultural producers.

In another related areas, access to EU markets has become more difficult due to tight rules of origin and a variety of non-trade barriers, including strengthened Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) measures. In the last 5 years in Uganda, for example, there have been several bans on fish exports by the EU. The first ban was related to the finding of

salmonella bacteria in fish exports from East Africa by the Spanish Veterinary Authorities; after which time, the EU started to systematically check all Nile Perch for salmonellae to ensure that 100% of fish were salmonella-free. A second ban imposed restrictions on chilled fish due to “insufficient measures applied by the sanitary authorities of these countries to control the outbreak of cholera” in the region (USAID, 2000, 3). The Food and Agriculture Organisation released a report following the ban, demonstrating that cholera does not present a health hazard to people through Nile Perch and also stressed that “introducing import restrictions on fish products from affected countries will disturb international trade and may encourage illegal trade, posing a potentially higher threat to consumers (FAO, 1998)”. During the second ban, the value of fish exports in Uganda declined from an average of \$ 1 million to \$100.000 per week, affecting fishermen's incomes and livelihoods. Thus, while the EU is an attractive market for ACP exporters, it is increasingly more difficult to adhere to the stringent import standards.

As the EU assists Eastern European countries in bringing their food processing industries up to EU regulatory standards with over Euro 3 billion worth of investment, ACP countries face a similar challenge. If equivalent levels of assistance are not provided for upgrading ACP food industries, ACP exporters will find it increasingly harder to compete in the larger integrated market.

Double Standards? The EU's own SPS challenges

While the EU continues to apply stricter standards on imports, many criticise the EU for *exporting* sub-standard products to ACP countries. In West Africa, for instance, sub-standard chicken products have flooded local markets at dramatically lower prices, driving the local price of poultry down. The Association of Protestant Development Agencies in Europe (APRODEV) recently released a research document written by a Cameroonian partner organisation on the impact of massive frozen poultry imports from the EU into Cameroon and West Africa. The report states that EU poultry has been highly infected by salmonella and other dangerous microbes. Up to 85 % of the sample tested is unfit for human consumption according to tests by the Institute Pasteur. APRODEV argues that such chicken dumping has led to unemployment for over 110 000 people.

Source: APRODEV and SOS FAIM. (2004). “EU Chicken meat exports ‘Ruining African Farmers’”
www.aprodev.net/trade/JAP-events.htm

For more information, refer to:

1. Wolf, Susanna. 2002. *CAP Reform and ACP Preferences: What is at Stake for ACP Countries?* in Trade Negotiations Insights: From Doha to Cotonou. Vol. 1, Iss. 4. www.acp-eu-trade.org/TNI_EN_1-4.pdf
2. EPAWatch. 2002. *The CAP Dimension*. www.epawatch.net/general/text.php?itemID=12&menuID=33

F. Possible exacerbation of intra-regional tensions

EPAs, as currently foreseen, may exacerbate intra-regional tensions rather than foster enhanced regional integration. The negotiating process for EPAs follows a strict schedule, resulting in a forced integration timetable. In practice, EPA negotiations have also split up already existing regional groupings, replacing them with imposed geographical configurations that may not be compatible with current integration efforts. For instance, in the East African Community, Tanzania is negotiating in a different group than the other members of the Community (Uganda and Kenya). In Southern Africa the South African Development Community is split into different groupings. By breaking up current regional groupings, EPAs hijack many ACP countries integration efforts. EPA integration also has a greater focus on trade and may ignore other important regional integration factors such as peace-building and infrastructure. Evidently, the process may in fact slow down the integration process or even cause its collapse; as a result, may jeopardise *genuine* regional integration.

For more information, refer to:

1. Thorp, Teresa. 2003. *Regional Implications for the ACP-EU Economic Partnership Agreements* The Global Trade Negotiations Center for International Development.
www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/Papers/thorp.pdf
2. CONCORD Cotonou Working Group. 2004. *Why the EU Approach to Regional Trade Negotiations With Developing Countries is Bad for Development*.
www.concordeurope.org/download.cfm?media=pdfUK&id=597

G. Singapore Issues

There has been a great deal of public resistance around EU attempts to force the inclusion of the so-called 'new' or 'Singapore' issues⁴ onto the WTO agenda. In fact, European insistence on this led to the breakdown of the Cancun meeting. There has been less of an outcry about their inclusion and further elaboration as part of the EU's agenda for EPAs. But in some ways the dangers within the EPA talks are greater because the EU is pursuing these areas on the basis of the same liberalisation, non-discrimination and national treatment agenda which poses threats to development, but this time from a position of even greater 'arm-twisting' power. It is instructive to note that the two issues that the EU seems prepared to drop from the multilateral stage – investment and transparency in public procurement – are the ones most clearly elaborated as part of their negotiating directives for EPAs. Since ACP countries are clear that they are not ready to talk about *any* of these issues at present in the WTO, some are concerned that it may be inappropriate for the EU to use the bilateral route to force the pace on these issues unless requested by the ACP group.

For more information, refer to:

1. Dodd, L. 2003. *Economic Partnership Agreements: The EU's New Trade Battleground* Traidcraft
www.epawatch.net/general/text.php?itemID=147&menuID=6
2. Charvériat C., Hutjes M., Leung T., and Gavidia D.P. 2003. *The Emperor's New Clothes Why rich countries want a WTO investment agreement*. Oxfam International
www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/trade/downloads/bp46_wto.pdf

2.3 Areas for improvement in the current EU approach

It is clear that EPAs place too onerous a burden on ACP countries and fail to provide positive prospects for ACP development. The EU, on the other hand, has not experienced such burden and should thus, act as a more responsible contributor to ACP-EU relations by adopting an improved, and more supportive approach. A coalition of European and ACP NGOs demand that EU-ACP trade cooperation should be founded on an approach that is:

- based on a principle of non-reciprocity, as instituted in GSPs and special and differential treatment in the WTO
- protects ACP producers domestic and regional markets;
- reverses the pressure for trade and investment liberalisation;
- allows the necessary policy space and supports ACP countries to pursue their own development strategies (see www.stopepa.org).

For more information, refer to:

⁴ At the 1996 WTO Ministerial meeting in Singapore four new issues were introduced in WTO negotiations. Investment, competition, transparency, government procurement, and trade facilitation therefore became collectively known as the "Singapore Issues."

1. CONCORD Cotonou Working Group. 2004. *Why the EU Approach to Regional Trade Negotiations With Developing Countries is Bad for Development*. www.concordeurope.org/download.cfm?media=pdfUK&id=597
2. Eurostep, GAWU, DHS, CIECA, GRAPAD. 2004. *New ACP-EU Trade Arrangements: New Barriers to Poverty Eradication?*. Brussels: Eurostep. eurostep.antenna.nl/docs/200405111106292970.pdf
3. Stevens, Christopher. 2002. *DTI/DFID Seminar on EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements*. Sussex: Institute of Development Studies. www.epawatch.net/general/text.php?itemID=18&menuID=40

2.4 Conclusion

The Cotonou Agreement builds upon a general shift occurring in international relations; a shift that emphasises trade and investment liberalisation, regional integration and compliance with WTO rules. Economic liberalisation policies within the Cotonou Agreement are rooted in assumptions that trade and investment liberalisation within developing countries stimulate economic growth, and thus, contribute to poverty reduction. Nonetheless, there are no clear illustrations of how the proposed EPA arrangements relate to poverty alleviation. Are Economic Partnership Agreements in themselves sufficient to sustain growth and eradicate poverty, or is there a need for deeper *intra-regional* integration within a political and cultural policy framework?

Chapter 3 Support

3.1 Funding for Non-State Actors through the EU

There are three possible opportunities for non-state actors to access financial resources:

1. Direct Access to EDF resources

Non-state actors' need for support, dialogue, networking, preparation and capacity-building has been recognized as key area requiring financial support. For this wide-ranging agenda, NSA will have direct access to funds via the EC delegations. The programming guidelines indicate that up to 15% of the initial indicative resource allocation to an ACP country *could* be directly allocated to non-state actors in this way. This is a very important opportunity for non-state actors because it means, for example, that NSA can introduce proposals to organise themselves to take part in the programming dialogue. It means, as well, that NSA can request funds for sensitisation and awareness seminars, networking, organisational development and other capacity-building agendas.

2. Implementing the NIP

A second option for non-state actors, implementing programs included in the National Indicative Programme, also relates to EDF resources. The level of resources that non-state actors may access will depend on the nature of these programmes (which may vary considerably for each country) as well as the relationship between non-state and state actors. Practically speaking, implementing the NIP may be broken down into three areas:

- a) *Public-private partnerships* allow for state and non-state actors to work together to design and implement programmes under the NIP. In such cases, funds for implementation of programmes may be offered to NSA to manage under the supervision of both the national government and the EU.
- b) *Decentralised cooperation* permits proposals to come *directly* from NSA. Such proposals may target priorities which have not been previously identified in the sectoral policies of the NIP or are more important for decentralised agents (see above).
- c) *Micro-projects* grant access to funds for more traditional projects adopted as far back as in Lomé I. These micro-projects can still be included in the NIP if so agreed upon in the programming dialogue.

3. The EC budget

The EDF is not the only source of funds available for the Cotonou Agreement. Additionally, the EU provides resources through a number of special budget lines managed by the EC (without interference from ACP governments) and financed by the overall EU budget (approved and monitored by the European Parliament). A well-known example of dispersal of such funds to NSA is the NGO co-financing budget line, through which European NGOs can support the activities of their ACP partners. The number of budget lines (and thus, opportunities) has grown dramatically over the years and now covers a wide range of issues including democracy, AIDS, environment and human rights.

The EC budget offers reasonably flexible sources of funding for activities proposed by non-state actors. Some funds are reserved for European NSA (e.g. the NGO co-financing line) and others are open to ACP NSA as well (e.g. decentralised cooperation).

In ACP countries where the relationship between state and non-state actors is tenuous, access to NIP funding may be very difficult. Thus, the EC budget may provide an alternative source of funding beyond government control.

However, the EU is currently reviewing and harmonising the system of budget lines in search for enhanced budgetary coherence. NSA will be increasingly invited to participate in sectoral programmes closely linked to the NIPs, rather than a wide ranging set of independent projects. NSA should prepare themselves for these on-going changes to EC budgetary facilities.

Be Aware of Issues Regarding EU funding!

Although EU funding presents an excellent opportunity, remember:

1. **The large number of applications:** Recipients receive a large funding sum, but it is important to remember that very few applications are approved in comparison to the amount received!
2. **Administrative constraints:** Recipients must adhere to strict administrative rules as to how they will spend funds.
3. **Co-financing:** Funds provided by the EU are often planned as co-financing schemes that may be as high as 50% funding by recipients themselves. Be realistic about available funds before applying.

For more information, refer to:

1. ECDPM. 2001. *Cotonou Infokit: Obtaining Resources (10)*. Maastricht: ECDPM. www.ecdpm.org
2. BOND. 2004. *EU Funding: The ins and outs*. www.bond.org.uk/eu/funding.html

3.2 Support from NGOs to NGOs

The key question all NGOs face is where and how to generate the income necessary to carry out their work and cover all general operational expenses. Which type of grants are appropriate for which activities? How can long term financing be secured through different financial resources? Many NGOs rely for a large part on grants from (international) donors. However, there are many other ways to find money for your activities, and external fund-raising is just one of them. For this reason, Both ENDS has compiled an information sheet that can be obtained from the website of Both ENDS.

Funding for specific ACP-EU activities outside the EU is relatively difficult as most NGOs do not have specific budget lines for ACP activities. The international NGOs active in the field of policymaking around Cotonou, include Action Aid (www.actionaid.org), Christian Aid (www.christian-aid.org.uk), the Friederich Ebert Stiftung (fesportal.fes.de/pls/portal30/docs/FOLDER/COTONOU/content/en.html) and some of the members of Oxfam (www.oxfam.org). If you need specific information you can contact Both ENDS through acp@bothends.org.

For more information, refer to:

1. Both ENDS. 2004. *Fact Sheet number 1: General Information on Fund-raising*. Amsterdam: Both ENDS. www.bothends.org/service/downloads/funding.pdf
2. Both ENDS. 1997. *Green and Grey below Sea level. An access Guide to Environmental and Development Organisations in the Netherlands*. 4th Revised edition, Both ENDS, 1997 (128 pp.). € 6.80 (excl. postage) ISBN 90-801592-8-X

3.3 NGOs from in the ACP regions:

The ACP Civil Society Forum was set up in 1997 following the first ACP NGO Conference in Entebbe Uganda. The Conference was organized with the objective of bringing together civil society organisations from the ACP regions, particularly after it was realized that in most sub-regions of the ACP Group, similar programmes had been put in motion by regional networks to increase the awareness and involvement of civil society in ACP-EU cooperation, particularly in view of the Lome IV re-negotiations. The lead organisations within the ACP Civil Society Forum include:

WEST INDIES FARMERS' ASSOCIATION (WINFA)

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St. Vincent
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E-mail: Winfa@caribsurf.com
Website: -

WINFA (Windward Islands Farmers Association) was setup in 1982 as an informal association of farmer groups to support the small scale farmers. It was later established as a formal umbrella organization of farmer associations from all four Winward islands in 1987. With the arrival of the WTO, free trade and the growing dominance of the large scale US producers (from Latin America), the Windward island banana farmers are fighting to keep their preferential trade agreements with their 'colonial' partners intact. In light of these developments WINFA has taken up an active advocacy role in defence of the banana farmers in the region.

WINFA is a member of **The Caribbean Policy Development Centre (CPDC)**, a coalition of Caribbean non-governmental organizations. It was established in 1991 to sensitize NGOs and the general public on key policy issues and to impact policy makers on decisions which put the interests of Caribbean people at the center of the Caribbean development strategy.

Since its inception CPDC has lobbied regional and international governments on behalf of the sections of the Caribbean populations whose voices are less heard. In doing so CPDC has become accepted as a significant social partner in the development of the region. More information can be found on: www.cpdngo.org

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EcoNews Africa (ENA) tries to enhance the role of East Africa's NGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs) to influence policy-making on issues of sustainable development, in particular on environment, trade and information. It's objective is to bridge the local-global information gap, paying particular attention to the international developments in the fields of environment, trade and developments. Informing and providing the relevant policy makers, non-governmental organisations and community based organisations with information with international processes that are likely to impact on national policies is EcoNews' primary target.

ENDA-TM

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Dakar, Sénégal
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Website: www.enda.sn

Environment and Development Action in the Third World (ENDA-TM) is an international non-profit organisation based in Dakar, Senegal. Founded in 1972, ENDA is an association of autonomous entities, with worldwide representation, co-ordinated by an Executive Secretariat.

ENDA relies essentially on the initiative and methods of popular action for its impetus. In general, Enda works to enhance the visibility and value, in practice as well as theory, of the knowledge and tools that exist in local development efforts. This consists of identifying and supporting community development initiatives - especially in terms of local organisations.

Interafrica Group

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Inter Africa Group (IAG) is an independent, non profit, non partisan international organisation. IAG was founded in 1989 and is based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. It operates in the areas of peace, justice and respect for humanitarian law and development issues in the Horn of Africa. Its programs combine networking, civic education, advocacy, dialogue and research. IAG co-operates and dialogues with a range of NGOs, governmental and intergovernmental organisation, bilateral and multilateral institution in the region.

MWENGO

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MWENGO is an acronym from the Kiswahili expression "Mwelekeo wa NGO which simply translates to direction of NGOs. MWENGO is a reflection and development centre for NGOs working in the Eastern and Southern Africa region. Its mission is to provide strategic leadership to empower/nurture a community of values by generating and mobilising African human and knowledge resources to support organisations fighting for social justice.

Pacific Concerns Resource Centre

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Pacific Concerns Resource Centre Inc. (PCRC) serves as the secretariat for the Nuclear Free and Independent Pacific (NFIP) Movement. Based in Suva, Fiji Islands, it acts for over 100 affiliated non-government and community organisations from around the Pacific.

It collects and disseminates information, works in the areas of advocacy and lobby, whilst promoting discussion and understanding and mobilising resources within and outside the region. Its five campaign areas are demilitarisation, decolonisation, environment, human rights and good governance and sustainable human development.

The Sustainable Human Development Desk looks at the effects of economic and trade institutions and agreements at international, regional and national level. It also focuses on building the capacity of Pacific NGOs in the implementation of the "new" ACP-EU Partnership Agreement Cotonou Agreement.

TWN Africa

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Third World Network (TWN-Africa) was established in 1994 under Ghanaian law as a non-profit company limited by guarantee. It is the autonomous Africa section of Third World Network (TWN), an independent non-profit coalition of organizations and individuals engaged in advocacy on issues related to development, environment and North-South affairs. It carries out research and advocacy on issues of social and economic policy. It seeks a greater articulation of the needs and rights of the peoples of the South, especially marginalized social groups, a fair distribution of the world's resources and forms of development which are ecologically sustainable and fulfill human needs.

TWN Africa is actively involved in research and advocacy on issues of social and economic policy that advances the needs and interests of peoples of African and other third world countries (especially marginalized social groups). It aims at a fair distribution of world's resources and strives towards forms of development which are sustainable and fulfil human needs.

TWN Africa plays a leading role in Africa, as it the co-ordinates **the Africa Trade Network** which was established in 1998 by TWN-Africa, and has 25 members from 15 countries in Africa. The ATN, which has observer status with the OAU and the UN-ECA and strong relations with UNCTAD, has been a key vehicle for TWN-Africa's work on issues of trade and investment policy in Africa. Through the ATN, TWN-Africa has given training to and provided information on trade policy matters to several civil society organisations, and mobilised African civil society participation in the international mobilisation on the WTO. It was also a key vehicle in organising the lobby and campaign by African civil society groups around the Seattle WTO Ministerial Conference. The ATN has observer status with the Organisation of African Unity, and has provided a means of increased interaction between civil society groups and African governments, including the annual Conference of African Ministers of Trade.

*The 1997 Entebbe Conference gave the mandate to these organisations to facilitate the full establishment of an ACP Civil Society Forum, which would serve as a platform for civil society organisations wishing to participate in ACP-EU co-operation processes. For more information on the **ACP civil society forum** please visit www.mwengo.org/acp*

Amongst the other NGO's working on Cotonou, SEATINI is amongst the most influential. Although not a formal part of the ACP civil society forum, SEATINI works closely with the above mentioned NGO's, for instance in the framework of the African Trade Network.

Southern and Eastern African Trade Information and Negotiations Institute (SEATINI)

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SEATINI is an African initiative to strengthen Africa's capacity to take a more effective part in the emerging global trading system and to better manage the process of Globalization. Its mission is to strengthen Africa in World Trade, striving for an open, equitable, rule-based, transparent, secure, non-discriminatory and predictable trading system. SEATINI has offices in several African countries, amongst which Kenya, Uganda and South Africa, and in Geneva.

3.4 NGOs active in the EU

There are an increasing number of European NGOs working on Cotonou issues. Below is a selection of the most important networks and a selection of NGOs that play a key role. Those NGOs and institutions providing useful information are listed in chapter 4.

European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development (CONCORD)

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Website: www.concordeurope.org

CONCORD is a new confederation that represents more than 1200 European NGDOs from 18 National Platforms and 14 European Networks. CONCORD aims enhancing the impact of European NGOs in influencing the European Institutions by combining expertise and representation. It's main objective is to coordinate its members. The political agenda of CONCORD for the coming years will cover:

- Active policy influencing to achieve 0.7% of GNP for financing Development Aid.
- Reformulating the role of Northern NGDOs towards their Southern Partners.
- Establishing a strong partnership with the European Institutions.
- Devising mechanisms to improve NGO legitimacy, representation and quality of work.
- Monitoring and safeguarding the EU's commitments to developing countries during the process of Enlargement and EU Reform.

Amongst CONCORD's core working groups are on EU funding, development education and EU presidencies. There are also a number of thematic working groups within CONCORD, amongst which are those working on trade and Cotonou. These are facilitated by members of CONCORD.

- Contact details CONCORD Cotonou Working Group on AID: POLLEN, Nathalie Legrand (POLLENasbl@compuserve.com)
- Contact details CONCORD Cotonou Working Group on Trade: Christian Aid, Jenny Brown (JBrown@christian-aid.org)

European Trade Network (ETN)

E-mail: join-etn@dgroups.org
Webmail: www.dgroups.org/groups/ETN/index.cfm

The European Trade Network is a loose network of European NGOs working in the area of trade. It aims to provide a forum for exchanging information and co-ordination of NGO advocacy and campaigns on trade issues. The ETN will allow for discussions on development, social, environment, human rights and other concerns relating to trade and meets regularly in Brussels. The ETN is member-based and its resources can only be accessed by members.

The Seattle to Brussels (S2B) Network

E-mail: sos-wto-eu@yahooogroups.com

Website: www.s2bnetwork.org

The Seattle to Brussels (S2B) Network is a pan-European network campaigning to promote a sustainable, socially and democratically accountable system of trade. The network includes development, environment, human rights, women's and farmers organisations, trade unions, social movements as well as research institutes. The S2B network was formed in the aftermath of the WTO's 1999 Seattle Ministerial to challenge the corporate-driven agenda of the European Union and other European governments for continued global trade and investment liberalisation. It has also developed as a response to the increasing need for European coordination among NGOs and in solidarity with Southern civil society groups.

Active groups in the Network are all supporters of the 'Our World Is Not For Sale: WTO Shrink or Sink' Statement (www.ourworldisnotforsale.org) and of Open letters to European Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy. In these statements groups demand to roll back the power and authority of the WTO and to develop a sustainable, socially and democratically accountable trade system.

Individual NGOs working in the framework of Cotonou are the following (this list is only a selection and by no-means all-encompassing):

11.11.11 Flemish Coalition of the North South Movement

Vlasfabriekstraat 11, 1060 Brussel, Belgium

Tel: +32 2 5361113

Fax: +32 2 5361910

E-mail: marc.maes@11.be

Website: www.11.be

The Flemish Coalition of the North-South Movement - 11.11.11 aims to strengthen the solidarity and the co-operation with the social organisations in the South. 11.11.11 focuses on increasing the awareness of the Belgian population on one hand, and political pressure on Belgian, European and international instances of government on the other. The organisation hosts www.epawatch.net and two mailing lists Cotonou Trade (CotonouTrade-subscribe@yahooogroups.com) and Cotonou Aid (CotonouAid-subscribe@yahooogroups.com). These mailing lists are in principle closed and only accessible to (NGO) members (send an e-mail to the above e-mail addresses).

Action for Southern Africa - ACTSA

28 Penton Street, London, N1 9SA United Kingdom

Tel: +44 207 8333133

Fax: +44 207 8378344

E-mail: actsa@actsa.org

Website: www.actsa.org

ACTSA campaigns with the people of Southern Africa as they strive to build a better future. Working for peace, democracy and development across the region, ACTSA is the successor organisation to the Anti-Apartheid Movement.

ACTSA influences decision-makers in Britain and Europe on policies that affect Southern Africa. It keeps the region in the public and political spotlight through lobbying, publication of reports and briefings and media work. All of the research and newsletters are online at www.actsa.org/Trade/main.htm

ACTSA cooperates in a network of sister organisations across Europe (called ENIASA www.eniasa.net). ENIASA is the co-ordinating structure of organisations within the European Union working to promote international solidarity with Southern Africa. ENIASA, like most of its 16 member organisations, was born out of the anti-apartheid movement and since 1995 has worked in support of peace, democracy and development in Southern Africa.

Africa Europe Faith and Justice Network (AEFJN)

Rue Joseph II, B 1000 Belgium
Tel: +32 2 2346812
Fax: +32 2 231 14 13
E-mail: mebstarreche@aefjn.org
Website: www.aefjn.org

Since 1988 the Africa-Europe Faith and Justice Network (AEFJN), a faith-based international network mandated by 44 catholic religious and missionary Institutes working in Africa and Europe, promotes equitable economic relations between Africa and Europe. AEFJN tries to lobby national political decision makers and the European Institutions, so as to influence positively decisions taken by the Union that adversely affect peoples of Africa.

Association of World Council of Churches related Development Organisations in Europe (APRODEV)

Boulevard Charlemagne 28, B-1000 Bruxelles Belgium
Tel : +32 2234 5660
Fax : +32 2234 5669
E-mail : admin@aprodev.net
Website : www.aprodev.org

APRODEV is the association of the 17 major development and humanitarian aid organisations in Europe, which work closely together with the World Council of Churches. APRODEV agencies engage in many kinds of activities related to development cooperation: fund raising, funding of emergency, relief, rehabilitation and development activities, capacity building, consultancy, awareness raising, education, and advocacy.

Both ENDS

Nieuwe Keizersgracht 45, 1018 VC Amsterdam, the Netherlands
Tel: +31 20 - 623 08 23
Fax: +31 20 - 620 80 49
E-mail: acp@bothends.org
Website: www.bothends.org

Both ENDS supports the work of environmental organisations, primarily in the so-called South (developing countries) and the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. We support organisations through information, research, advocacy, campaigning, networking and capacity-building. Both ENDS monitors the EU-ACP trade negotiations and tries to facilitate civil society both in Europe as in the ACP to be able to influence ACP-EU policymaking.

European Research Office (ERO)

E-mail: 2pg@pandora.be

The European Research Office is a small research centre which provides excellent analysis of EU policies. It mainly operates in Southern Africa and monitors the impact of

the Common Agricultural Policy on developing countries, as well as the developments within the ACP-EU trade negotiations. As such, ERO provides regular updates on different websites, amongst which www.epawatch.net.

Traidcraft

16 Baldwin's Gardens, London EC1N7RJ United Kingdom
Tel: +44 20 72423955
Fax: +44 2072426173
E-mail: lizdo@traidcraft.org
Website: www.traidcraft.org

Traidcraft consists of Traidcraft plc, a trading company and Traidcraft Exchange its linked charity. Traidcraft plc provides a working model of fair trade within the commercial sector, with sales of over £10 million in 2001/02 while Traidcraft Exchange works to promote fairer trading systems as a solution to global poverty. The Policy Unit is an integral part of the work of Traidcraft Exchange.

Traidcraft 's Policy Unit works positively with Governments, Business and Institutions to push for initiatives and policies which ensure a better deal for the poor in developing countries. The unit also works with Traidcrafts overseas partners on a range of joint programmes and to build in-country policy capacity.

World, Ecology, Economy and Development (WEED)

Torstr. 154. D-10115 Berlin, Germany
Tel: +49 30 2759 4405
Fax: +49 30 2759 6928
E-mail: klaus.schilder@weed-online.org
Website: www.weed-online.org

WEED is a lobby and advocacy organisation working towards the reform of the European North-South policy. In this context WEED is focussing on EU trade policy as it relates to the ACP countries.

WEED aims to counter deregulation and privatization tendencies, as they currently prevail in European North-South policy, with a EU-policy that is oriented along the vision of socially just and ecologically sustainable development. The main emphasis of its activities is on the critical examination of EU foreign trade and investment policies towards the countries of the South. In addition to a careful analysis of the new EU-ACP cooperation agreement, the activities focus on other regional negotiations (e.g. the Mercosur), the critical observation of current EU negotiations on free trade agreements and the EU policy within the WTO framework as it relates to developing countries.

WEED has some information on its policy work published in English under www2.weed-online.org/eu/index_e.htm

Chapter 4 Useful websites

ACP Civil Society Forum

www.mwengo.org/acp/

This network of civil society organizations publishes a monthly online ACP newsletter introducing new themes each month. The website also has a database with information on ACP organisations active in different sectors such as advocacy, research and trade.

ACP-EU Joint Assembly

www.europarl.eu.int/intcoop/acp/en/default.htm

Contains information on the role, members, working groups of the Joint Assembly, as well as agendas, reports and working documents.

ACP-EU-trade website

www.acp-eu-trade.org/

An excellent source of information, documents, studies and links on ACP-EU trade matters provided by the joint initiative of [ECDPM](#), the [EU-LDC Network](#) and [ODI](#). The website also offers links to official documents such as the Programming Guidelines for Trade for the EC Development Co-operation and the Draft ACP Guidelines for the negotiations of EPAs.

ACP General Secretariat

www.acpsec.org/

The website of the secretariat of the African Caribbean and Pacific Group of States provides information on the institutions of the ACP and on upcoming events. The Cotonou agreement can also be consulted and information on individual ACP member states is available online. The related site (www.acpsec.org/gb/jointass/default.htm) contains press releases by the ACP General Secretariat on the proceedings of the Joint Assembly.

Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA)

www.actsa.org

ACTSA publishes the Trade and Development Update which is a free online newsletter. The aim of the organisation is to cover key developments in trade between Europe and Southern Africa and to incorporate views and analysis from key players, especially those in Southern Africa.

CONCORD

www.concordeurope.org

CONCORD is the European NGOs Confederation for Relief and Development. View *Topics* to get direct access to Cotonou-related documents.

European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM)

www.ecdpm.org/

ECDPM provides a comprehensive infokit on Cotonou: an essential source of information on ACP-EU partnership agreement. The centre also offers 'The Cotonou Agreement: A User's Guide for Non-State Actors'

ELDIS

www.eldis.org

This gateway to development information is an excellent guide to documents in specific thematic areas. View *Trade Policy* to have quick access to Cotonou/Lomé related articles.

EPAwatch

www.epawatch.net

This is a very comprehensive website meant as an instrument to monitor the trade negotiations between the European Union and the ACP countries which will take place between 2002 and 2008 with the aim of concluding (EPAs).

European Forum on International Cooperation (Euforic)

www.euforic.org/by_theme/726.htm

Euforic provides documents on ACP-EU cooperation mostly taken from the *ACP-EU Courier*, the magazine distributed by the EU.

Europaworld

www.europaworld.org/

Several EU-ACP related articles can be found on the website under the heading trade and globalisation. The website reports on development issues from a European perspective.

European Union website

europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/cotonou/index_en.htm

Access the original text of the Cotonou Agreement and links to related websites, links to the special issues of the ACP-EU Courier on Cotonou.

europa.eu.int/comm/development/body/publications/publications_courier_en.htm

European Solidarity Towards Equal Participation of People (Eurostep)

www.eurostep.org

Eurostep monitors various aspects of the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement including civil society participation, EDF budgetisation, and trade. To access relevant information, view *Africa/ Caribbean/ Pacific* under Regional Activities.

Friedrich- Ebert- Stiftung (FES)

fesportal.fes.de/pls/portal30/docs/FOLDER/COTONOU/content/en.html

The FES network provides documents, links, news and upcoming events concerning Cotonou affairs. FES relies on a 21-member strong network in Sub-Saharan Africa for current and up-to-date information and analysis.

International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD)

www.ictsd.org/tni/index.htm

The ICTSD publishes a joint [ECDPM- ICTSD](#) bimonthly newsletter *Trade Negotiations Insights*, focusing on the major issues faced by all African and ACP countries in their international trade negotiations at the WTO and with the EU in the context of the Cotonou Agreement.

International Gender & Trade Network

www.genderandtrade.net/Cotonou.htm

Gender related reports and papers including: "EPAs-What's in it for Women?"; a gender based impact assessment on "Women in Zimbabwe: Issues in future trade negotiations with the EU" and a position paper on the future of EU/ACP development cooperation.

Network Women in Development Europe

www.eurosur.org/wide/EU/Cotonou/newcotonou.htm

This network of development and gender NGOs and specialists has a useful position paper discussing gender and Cotonou, as well as other gender EU-ACP agreements related documents. (Available under the heading Awareness raising, Lobbying, Advocacy or through the search function on the website keyword: Cotonou).

No to EU-ACP free trade agreements

www.stopepa.org

This website acts as a global coalition of ACP and EU civil society organizations against the EU's current approach to negotiating free trade agreements with ACP countries. Sign the 'STOP EU-ACP FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS' statement.

Annex: List of ACP Member States

1. Angola
2. Antigua and Barbuda
3. Bahamas
4. Barbados
5. Belize
6. Benin
7. Botswana
8. Burkina Faso
9. Burundi
10. Cabo Verde
11. Cameroun
12. Comores
13. Congo
14. Cook Islands
15. Côte D'ivoire
16. Cuba
17. Democratic Republic of Timor
Leste
18. Djibouti
19. Dominica
20. Eritrea
21. Ethiopia
22. Fiji
23. Gabon
24. Gambia, The
25. Ghana
26. Grenada
27. Guinea
28. Guinea Ecuatorial
29. Guiné-Bissau
30. Guyana
31. Haiti
32. Jamaica
33. Kenya
34. Kiribati
35. Lesotho
36. Liberia
37. Madagascar
38. Malawi
39. Mali
40. Marshall Islands
41. Mauritania
42. Mauritius
43. Micronesia, Federal State of
44. Moçambique
45. Namibia
46. Nauru
47. Niger
48. Nigeria
49. Niue
50. Palau
51. Papua New Guinea
52. Republica Dominicana
53. République Centrafricaine
54. République Démoncratique du
Congo (R.D.C)
55. Rwanda
56. St. Kitts and Nevis
57. St. Lucia
58. St. Vincent and the Grenadines
59. Samoa
60. São Tomé e Príncipe
61. Sénégal
62. Seychelles
63. Sierra Leone
64. Solomon
65. Somalia
66. South Africa
67. Sudan
68. Suriname
69. Swaziland
70. Tanzania
71. Tchad
72. Togo
73. Tonga
74. Trinidad and Tobago
75. Tuvalu
76. Uganda
77. Vanuatu
78. Zambia
79. Zimbabwe

Cuba is an ACP member, but did not sign the Cotonou Agreement. As such Cuba is not part of the EPA negotiations and does not receive support from the EDF. South Africa is also an ACP member, but already has its own FTA with the EU.